I read this book a few years ago, in the hopes of gaining a better understanding of the first few months of the German attack on Russia (Operation Barbarossa). Most of our current knowledge of these events is based upon German-centric accounts, primarily because western researchers did not have good access to Soviet documents. This book, written from the Russian point of view, is an attempt to introduce a new reason for why the German attack, after a string of huge victories, finally stalled in front of the gates of Moscow at the end of 1941.

The premise is interesting: that Barbarossa failed not because of German mistakes (primarily the oft-cited turning of Army Group Center to the south to encircle Kiev), but because of Soviet strategy. This strategy the the authors identify was one of echeloned defense before Moscow and along the southern flank of Army Group Center, so that the entire Soviet force would not be defeated on the borders. Furthermore, it was designed to gradually wear down the combat effectiveness of the Germans. In essence, forward units were sacraficed in order to provide more divisions for deeper defense.

Unfortunately, the authors do not present convincing evidence that this "echeloned defense in depth" was a pre-planned strategy. They identify a series of Soviet war games, including one just uncovered (this in and of itself is interesting, and could be the basis for more historical research). This new-found game was kept secret from the entire Red Army except some of the very top leaders (Zhukov, Stalin, and Timoshenko). The authors interpret the outcome of this game as showing the need for an echeloned defense.

The logical leap the authors make next is the key problem with the book. This is the basic logical premise of the authors: Zhukov and Timoshenko were at the game, and Stalin was informed of the results. The game purports to show the folly of an up-front defense. The events of the German attack followed a course similar to the secret wargame. Ergo, Zhukov and Stalin used the game to set up the defense of the Soviet Union.

What you get is a big maybe. There is no conclusive evidence showing that the result of the wargame influenced the defense of the Soviet Union. The entire book is based upon this circumstantial evidence. Given the scope of the authors' claim (that the Russians defeated the Germans according to plan in 1941) this is unsatisfactory and a big disappointment.

The authors' claim also raises some important questions:

• Why, if the Soviet's plan was for an echeloned defense, would they still sacrafice nearly 3 million men in the opening border-battles in the summer of 1941?
• If the Soviets knew how rapidly and decisively the Germans would advance in the initial attack, why did they move so many infantry and armored formations to forward areas after the attack, only to be encircled? Why would their air force be caught off-guard and completely destroyed in the opening days of the attack?
• If the German attack was stemmed according to plan, why did the Soviets need to call up conscripts as early as they did, or send tanks off to battle straight from the factories? Wouldn't they have already prepared for this?
• If the plan was to not defend the borders, but defeat the Germans well-within Russia, why didn't the Soviets begin to move factories further east before the German attack?
• The Russians seemed to do reasonably well slowing the attack at the borders in the Ukraine, where more units were positioned for an up-front defense. Was part of the plan to lure Army Group Center farther in, and then tempt it to turn south to bag nearly the entire Soviet Army at Kiev? If so, I don't want to see what a bad Soviet plan would have been.

In short, the authors do not demonstrate in any convincing way that Barbarossa went according to Russian expectations. Their flimsy circumstantial evidence can not begin to address the current state of knowledge about the German attack on the Soviet Union. While I don't buy the argument that the Germans could have defeated Russia if only they hadn't turned their AG-Center to the south (i.e. Stolfi's premise that "it was Hitler's fault" and the Red Army was hardly a factor), I don't buy Fugate et al either. The Russians were obviously caught off-guard, and they lost practically their entire army and air force because of it. It's hard to imagine that the first few months of Barbarossa were going according to Russian plans. I think a more plausible path would be to examine how the Red Army managed to improvise, and with some luck, put together a workable defense around Yelnia on the Dnepr to throw the Germans off their schedule. My take is that the Germans didn't have much of a plan beyond the initial border attack (several authors have shown that Barbarossa was severerly under-planned) and the Russians didn't have much of a plan to stop an attack. Yet, some combination of events obviously stalled the Germans of Army Group Center at Yelnia. It's just hard to believe that it was because the Russians planned to draw the Germans past Smolensk to the very suburbs of Moscow in order to defeat them there. Anyway, Thunder on the Dnepr is an interesting read, even it isn't wholly convincing.

In a nutshell: Terrible analysis, faulty conclusions, but useful chronology of Barbarossa.

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