Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler's Panzer Counteroffensive

By Mark J. Reardon

Victory at Mortain is a comprehensive look at the German counterattack toward Avranches in early August, just following the COBRA breakout in Normandy.  Reardon's book is useful, as the battle is under-studied and not widely known.  Indeed there is only one other widely available and read book on the subject (Featherstone's Saving the Breakout).  Further, Reardon's book is very good in that it provides insights into both German and US command decisions and tactical movements.  In this way, it becomes easy for the reader to see exactly how both sides were making decisions, and how those choices directly played out on the battlefield.

Reardon starts his book with two chapters devoted to the situation in Normandy from July to the first few days of August 1944. These chapters show what the German plan for defense was (contain, contain, contain), and how the US breakout from Normandy progressed.  This serves to set the context for the rest of the book.  The very nature of the breakout served to "offer up" the option of a German counterattack through the Mortain area toward Avranches.  This town represented the tenuous link between US Armies (First and Third) and served as the primary logistics/supply rout.  Moving south through Avranches, US forces of the Third Army could and did turn west into Brittany and east to threaten the southern flank of the German 7th Army, which was trying to contain the US First Army.  A German breakthrough to Avranches would surround most of the Third Army and have the simultaneous effect of solidifying the German 7th Army positions.  This would have allowed the Germans to shift more resources to continue to contain the Normandy lodgments.  It would have been a stunning blow to the Americans and would have completely derailed the Allied breakout from the vicious boccage country of Normandy.

Of course, this didn't happen.  The counterattack (Operation Luttich) failed, largely due to an inauspicious infantry division...the US 30th.  Although it got help at key points in the counterstrike against the German thrust from portions of the 2nd Armored Division (on the southern flank) and the 3 Armored Division (on the northern flank), the 30th bore the brunt of the initial onslaught.  Being able to stop an entire Panzerkorp (including the vaunted 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions, the 116th Panzer Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, and part of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier division) dead in its tracks is an amazing achievement.  Reardon shows us that the German attack failed due to a combination of factors: bad German staff planning, bad German battlefield tactics, tenacious US roadblocks, the aggressiveness of the US 119th, 120th, and 117th regimental commanders, US artillery and airpower, and a bold American (3rd Army) thrust toward LeMans southeast of the battlefield and subsequent drive north to envelope the units that had participated in Operation Luttich in the Falaise Pocket.

Unlike the conventional wisdom about the battle, which focuses excessively on the the struggle for Hill 314 and the trapped second battalion, 120th infantry, Reardon spends more time on the attack through St. Barthelmy, and the northern flank, which represented the Germans' main push.  He convincingly shows that the few AT guns and the battalion's worth of infantry holding St. Barthelmy effectively derailed the German plans.  Further, Reardon faults German commanders for not bypassing the town, who instead chose to continue to ram against the US defenders.  Although the Germans eventually did take the town, the other German units to the north now had an exposed flank.  The Germans failed to press hard and stopped their advanced units, which then had to retreat.  This action, and armored thrusts around Barenton (southeast of Mortain) were the keys to halting the German advance.  Additionally, Reardon faults the Germans for uninspired leadership, for not securing the southeast flank at Barenton, for failing to use recon units in their proper role of info gathering rather than combat units, for failing to coordinate with the Luftwaffe, and for mismanaging artillery assets.  These German problems, coupled with good regimental leadership on the US side, added up to a US victory.

Reardon does give pause, however.  Had the Germans been more adept in their attack, it's not clear the Americans would have been able to contain them.  Reardon notes that the divisional command functions nearly completely failed (or were non-existent).  The 30th Infantry Division did not fight as a division, but rather are three nearly-independent regiments.  This hampered coordination between regiments, hindered the ability to link artillery and armor assets with the battalions that needed them, and hurt the ability to time the counterattack against the Germans.  In the end, bad German tactics and leadership, coupled with a sweep to LeMans to tear open the southern flank of the German army, is what sealed the deal.

This is a very good book.  It is a useful history in that it provides an analysis and critique of both sides' command decisions, and displays how those decisions turned out on the battlefield.  In my opinion, it is the definitive account of the German offensive at Mortain.  My only problem with the book is that in places the text jumps temporally; there are places where a new section of the book will describe events that occurred prior to what was just happening in the previous section.  This got very confusing, and at several places I had to jump back about a hundred pages to reference earlier text and maps.  I think it is critical that any book maintain a clear timeline; exactly how a book progresses through time is irrelevant so long as the reader knows exactly how that progression is taking place.  Reardon provides no such clear timeline.

In a nutshell:  Historical analysis has never been this exciting, even if the timeline is hard to follow.

Email me with comments at michael.licari@uni.edu

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