Inside the Afrika Korps
By Col. Rainer Kriebel and the U.S. Army Intelligence Service; ed. by
Bruce Gudmundsson
Inside the Afrika Korps is a rare operational account of some
of the battles in North Africa from the German perspective. The material
covers the campaign in the fall of 1941 (the British "Crusader" offensive),
the retreat of Axis forces out of Cyrenaica, and the counterattack in early
1942 back to the Gazala positions. During these battles, Kriebel was
the senior staff officer of the 15th Panzer Division, one of the units in
Rommel's Afrika Korps. As a key member of the forces under Rommel,
Kriebel is in an excellent position to analyze both the decision making of
Axis commanders as well as the combat performance of the fighting units.
This is in contrast to the typical accounts of the desert theater,
which rely heavily (indeed exclusively for many) on Allied reports. So,
at the very least, Kriebel provides a unique account of some familiar engagements.
The book is divided into two sections. The first is Kriebel's coverage
of combat operations from fall 1941 through January 1942. These operations
include the opening Crusader battles (the British offensive to relieve Tobruk),
Rommel's "dash to the wire", the subsequent retreat of the Axis forces out
of Cyrenaica, and Rommel's counterattack through Cyrenaica back to the Gazala
positions. Kriebel's description of combat is quite good, and he has
a very interesting technical and tactical story to tell. He is conscious
of the various effects of different types of weapons and units, and is clear
in his explanations of use and usefulness. He is also very clear about
what he thinks were the key events that shaped each engagement. For
example, one battle went poorly for the Germans due to a failed recon mission.
This is very "nuts and bolts" stuff...the very sort of stuff that cannot
be gotten from any other source. As a result, the "inside view" of
the battles of the Afrika Korps is fascinating.
In this section, Kriebel also takes the opportunity to assess Rommel's leadership.
In short, he does not deify him. Instead, a frank analysis of
Rommel's abilities and shortcomings is presented. For example, Kriebel
directly faults Rommel for micromanaging Afrika Korps units, typically to
the detriment of those units. By ignoring the chain of command, Rommel
created confusion, issued conflicting orders, and made tactical mistakes
that a commander more familiar with the particular tactical situation
would not have. He also identifies
key moments where Rommel misinterpreted or ignored intelligence reports about
the location and intentions of Allied forces. This got him into trouble
several times, particularly in his failed "dash to the wire". On the
other hand, Kriebel credits Rommel for occasionally perosonally leading
critical units and commanding loyalty, so although the assessment
of Rommel shows his flaws,
the final conclusion is that his leadership was a decisive factor in the
successes (even in retreat) of the Axis forces in North Africa. In
any event, Kriebel's picture of Rommel is undoubtedly more accurate than
some of the traditional Western assessments that portray Rommel as an infallible
god of war.
Throughout this section, Kriebel offers assessments of the situation on the
ground (disposition and state of units), the supply situation, and the air
situation. Thus, the book offers a rare view of how logistics, air
power, and land power came together to dictate how operations went. The
supply situation is particularly interesting, as both sides relied heavily
on captured booty, and the vagaries of Axis supply shipments made consistent
operations difficult (Kriebel seems very frustrated at times, recounting
how pursuits had to be called off due to a complete lack of fuel). Editor
Bruce Gudmundsson clarifies a few points here and there (particularly unit
information) but for the most part his touch is not visible.
The second section is written by the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, and
is titled "Artillery in the Desert". It is an analysis of Axis and
British combat tactics and weaponry. Much of this is very straightforward,
and is presented as sort of a manual on "how to conduct desert warfare".
This includes everything from how to set up defensive strongpoints,
how to employ FOOs, at what ranges to begin firing different types of weapons,
and how to conduct (or defend against) an armored attack. Much of this
is interesting, particularly to game designers, as it presents good detail
on how to prepare for and carry out battle. However, some of it is
quite fanciful, and is obviously the result of faulty intelligence that has
not been revised. One strikingly absurd example is the claim that the
short 75mm gun of the Pz IV had a maximum range of 9000 yards and that these
AFVs were employed as "sniper tanks" at this extremely long range. While
Gudmundsson apparently has edited the material, he obviously missed this
mistake. Although the other information provided regarding tactics
and practices of combat seem accurate, this problem should make the reader
at least somewhat skeptical.
I enjoyed this book, mostly because of its "inside view" of the Axis forces.
Although it can not be the "final word" on the winter 1941/1942 battles
in North Africa, nor should it be the first book you read on the topic, it
certainly should be the second one you read. The battles covered are
familiar, but the perspective is unique, and so I recommend this book.
In a nutshell: the Crusader battles like you've never seem them before, with
a primer on desert warfare thrown in as a bonus.
Email me with comments at michael.licari@uni.edu
Back to the Book Review
page.
Back to my ASL
page.