The Bloody Road to Tunis
By David Rolf
The Bloody Road to Tunis is a sweeping look at the ejection
of the Axis forces from Tunisia by the British and American armies in 1942-1943.
Most American readers are familiar with the battles around Kassarine
Pass. While these are undoubtedly important for the development of
the US Army in World War II, they are but a small part of the overall campaign.
At the very least, Rolf's book puts Kassarine Pass into broader perspective.
Rolf's book, therefore, is a good look at the operational decision
making by the Allied top leadership as well as the tactical and logistical
issues that faced both the Allied and Axis forces. The Bloody Road
to Tunis is comprehensive as well, covering the initial Allied thrust
into Tunisia from the Torch landings, the Axis counterattacks (Kassarine
Pass was but one), Montgomery's push from the south, and the final knock-out
blows delivered in early 1943.
Due to the broad perspective, much of the book focusses on operational
and tactical decision making. Rolf pulls no punches in assessing both
Allied and Axis leadership. There were few brilliant minds in any
of the armies doing battle in Tunisia, although each were deficient for
different reasons. Most American commanders were inept and/or inexperienced;
the Italian leadership suffered from poor operational and tactical flexibility;
the German commanders were over-confident and fractious; the British leaders
were arrogant and plodding. The reader comes away with the thought
that the battles in Tunisia were not ones of decisive generalship, but rather
were won because the other side made more mistakes. In the end, although
Rolf does not explicitly make the statement, it is apparent that Tunisia
was cleared of Axis troops because they ran out of logistical support rather
than being beaten by superior Allied military skill.
Rolf's descriptions of how battle plans played out are quite good, and
the reader is treated to a good view of how the various command problems
on all sides manifested themselves (both on the battlefield and in terms
of interpersonal and inter-army relations). The descriptions of the
actual fighting is a bit mechanical and boring. Since the subject of
the book is so broad, individual firefights do not get much attention outside
of the some coverage of the key events. The books is not about war
at the personal level (something that many readers have grown accustomed
to with all of the personal accounts and "oral histories" that have been
popping up like weeds), but rather its subject is operational. What
Rolf offers is a critical assessment of the Tunisia operation, from both
sides.
His final analysis shows that the Allies clearly made a mistake in not
pushing hard right away into Tunisia. This let the Axis build up their
forces and caused the campaign to stretch on for months rather than being
wrapped up in a much shorter time (with less loss of life). Rolf correctly
faults British timidness and plodding generalship: British commanders were
in charge of operational planning. Rolf additionally criticizes Montgomery's
less-than-inspired leadership and decisionmaking regarding his advance to
and attack through the Mareth Line. In the end, Rolf argues that Montgomery's
contribution to the Tunisian campaign was negligible and essentially served
as a distraction to Allied leaders as well as to the Axis.
Regarding the American army, he brutally assesses Eisenhower's failures:
most of the blame for the poor performance and the debacle of Kassarine
Pass can be ultimately be placed squarely on him. Eisenhower knew
of the inabilities of his subordinates, as well as of the fact that British
decisions were hanging American units out to dry, but failed to act by not
replacing personnel and not making objections to British commanders. And
although the Americans can not be faulted for being "green" (armies have
to start somewhere, after all), Rolf does criticize unit commanders for being
terribly slow to learn from the battlefield. Rolf faults German leaders
with overconfidence, which lead to costly counterattacks that depleted resources
for little gain. He also criticizes German commanders for squabbling
amongst themselves (even fighting over control of divisions), which ended
up seriously jeopardizing ongoing missions. In the end, however, strategic
miscalculations regarding North Africa and failed logistical support sunk
the chances of the Axis armies in Tunisia.
I liked this book because of its scale: few books cover the subject at
the operational level, and instead analyze individual battles or units.
Rolf puts these works into context, which is a great service.
In a nutshell: a frank assessment of Tunisian campaign, if a bit dryly
written.
Email me with comments at michael.licari@uni.edu
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