This book is an operational-level account of the Soviet advance across central and western Poland from the Vistula to the Oder rivers in the Winter/Spring of 1945. As such, it deals with movement and command of divisions, armies, and Fronts. I enjoyed this book primarily because this portion of the war is curiously not extensively covered by popular or mass-market WWII history books. This is partly due, I think, to the fact that the actions in Hungary at the same time get so much attention. Due to our over-reliance on German sources and paltry access to ex-Soviet archives, we pay more attention to the small German attack (Spring Awakening) in Hungary than we do to the enourmously successful efforts on the part of the Red Army to eject the Germans from Poland and Prussia.

One central argument that Duffy makes is that the Soviet attack ground to a halt in February on the Oder River (rather than pushing headlong into Berlin in March) for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons are old stand-bys and are widely accepted: serious supply shortages as a result of fighting across half of Poland in a very short time; and the Spring thaw brought movement to a halt (mud has no allies, and the rivers that had been crossed via ice now had to be bridged). To these common explanations, Duffy adds several more intriguing ones. First, he argues that the Germans were now defending actual German soil and thus put up a tougher fight. Second, the Germans were actually able to win air superiority for a several-week stretch (due to the fact that the Luftwaffe was able to use paved runways around Berlin, while the Russians had to rely on muddy/unusable grass strips in Poland). Third, although the Germans were suffering in manpower, so too were the Russians, who's divisions were barely above 50% of authorized strength. Plus, the Germans now had shortened interior lines and could move troops from the West Front quickly. Fourth, and most interestingly, he argues that while Hitler's "stand fast" orders did doom the German forces along the Baltic coast (in Prussia and northern Poland) the presence of these forces along the Soviet flank forced a pause and a directional change in the attack from west to north. This argument is indeed convincing, and the concerns of the Soviet commanders seem to bear this out.

Although the operational-level gives the book a "broad-brush" picture, enough personal accounts are used to really give the battles flavor and meaning. Enough detail on specific events is also given (primarily in the footnotes) to steer readers onto other sources that will treat the battles at a more tactical level. The book is easy to read, and there are many maps to help keep track of the action. I like this book. That said, this book will not be useful as a primary source for ASL scenario designers, although it will be useful to get the "big picture" as well as to pick up some historical curiosities that are otherwise might be missed. For example, the battles of the "fortress" cities of Breslau and Konigsberg are covered each with their own chapters. Another neat example is the fact that the German heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen and the Admiral Scheer both played instrumental roles in providing fire support for German ground forces. They both fired thousands of rounds to halt Soviet attacks on a number of occasions.

I recommend this book for those interested in the history of the last 6 months of WWII.

In a nutshell: Unique account of an oft-ignored portion of WWII.

Email me with comments at michael.licari@uni.edu

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