Monty In Command

Monty In Command: An Assessment

Bernard Law Montgomery is certainly one, if not the, most controversial commanders of the Second World War. Much of this is his own fault: he was arrogant, dismissive, scheming, and a liar. He even recognized himself as someone who was difficult to get along with. None of these things, in and of themselves, made him a bad commander. Many generals throughout history have exhibited similar personal characteristics. Too frequently, however, people confound an odious personality with an inability to effectively command troops. This essay therefore is not about Montgomery’s interpersonal skills, or lack thereof: they simply do not matter. It is instead about his ability to lead and his capacity for operational warfare.

Even on the issue of Monty’s capacity for operational warfare, there is heated debate between his critics and supporters. Therefore I will assess, one by one, the arguments that are offered as evidence of Monty’s proficiency in command.

1. “Monty skillfully handled his 3rd Division during the German attack on France in 1940.”

This is certainly true. Under Montgomery’s direction, the 3rd Division performed quite well in defensive battles, holding off the Germans and protecting the retreat of nearby Allied units. Then the 3rd Division executed a withdrawal in good order to the Dunkirk position, where it was finally evacuated. None of these exploits, however, can be offered as evidence of Monty’s prowess in conducting offensive operational warfare. The withdrawal in particular simply provides evidence of competent staff work, which is not under question.

2. “Monty was fighting with a small, casualty-conscious military, and therefore had to fight methodical battles, emphasizing caution and patience”

It is time to put this canard to rest. The literature on combined arms operations demonstrates that the best way to deal with this problem is to win decisively and quickly. Using aggressive operations to avoid a Stellungskrieg (war of position, as in trench warfare) is the best way to avoid a costly, long war of attrition. The Germans, who fought the Second World War under these same restrictions knew they could only win by thoroughly beating the enemy with fast operational campaigns. If we praise the Germans of 1939, 1940, and 1941 for their operational prowess as a result of their inability to fight a prolonged war, we should hold Monty to these same standards. The added excuse that “Monty was a product of World War I and its terrible casualties” ignores the fact that the German leaders and military went through the same experience, but came out far better. Monty simply did not learn the right lessons.

3. “Monty beat the Germans decisively at El Alamein and then chased them all the way to Tunisia”

Montgomery barely beat the Germans at El Alamein, and the outcome of the battle was hardly “decisive” since the German forces in North Africa were not destroyed. Monty also did not beat an Axis force that was anywhere near the peak of its strength. Rommel was critically weakened by his failed end-around the Alamein position, where he impaled his force on the British at Alam Halfa (incidentally, the British defenses were laid out according to Auchinleck's plans). Practically out of fuel, Rommel was forced to accept positional warfare, on the defensive. Despite the weakness of the Germans, Monty's attack went badly and was a close-run thing. Only with the early committment of his armor was Monty able to punch through the German lines. The fact that he nearly bagged the German forces was due more to Rommel obeying (briefly) Hitler's ill-advised "stand fast" order.

The subsiquent "pursuit" of Rommel's forces was badly handled and lacked vigor. It was a faiulre, not a victory, particularly since in North Africa more than anywhere else it was the destruction of the enemy that mattered, not taking territory. At this time, Monty enjoyed total sea, air, land, and logistic superiority. With ULTRA, he also knew that he had such superiority. This means his short hooks were excessively timid, his failure to try very hard to cut off the Germans by sending stronger forces across Cyrenaica via Mchili-Msus-Agedabia is extremely disappointing (he only sent a thin screen of armored cars), and his pause in front of Al Agheila to prepare for a set-piece battle reveals a distinct lack of vigor. The short leash that Monty kept on his divisional commanders was inappropriate for the fluidity of the pursuit. Also inappropriate was his penchant for a set-piece battle despite the fact that he had to know that the Germans would not stand and fight. Supporters of Monty argue that his logistics were stretched thin and the weather was terrible. Both are true. Of course, both are also true, and perhaps more important to, the Germans. In the end, these are excuses that do not explain away the fact that Monty could have done better.

4. "Monty did an excellent job, or at least as good as he could, with a poor instrument"

This has some merit, and certainly adds a layer of complexity to the debate, making it difficult to flatly state that Monty was "terrible". A growing number of authors have demonstrated that the British army in World War II was not that good. It started out badly and hardly, if at all, improved during the course of the war (see Heginbotham's MIT security studies paper, and subsequently in the May/June 2000 edition of Military Review; Hart in Clash of Arms; French in Raising Churchill's Army, Place in Military Training in the British Army). Therefore, the argument is that Monty was indeed a great commander, but was hampered by having to wield a bad army. It is probably true that the British army was not very good, yet this argument seems like excuse-making for Monty. It certainly provides no positive evidence in support of Monty being a great commander. Additionally, when other armies are criticized as being poor (the Americans in North Africa, the Italians, the Soviets in 1941 and 1942) these critiques are used to also impugne the commanders of those armies. Why then does Monty get a "free pass"? If his army performed poorly, is that not at least partially the result of his command?

5. "Monty was a great commander because he was able to make solid, clever plans that relied on the key Allied strength: firepower."

Monty certainly did base most of his plans on firepower, particularly since he was enamored with the set-piece battle. This argument in favor of Monty seems to mask, however, the problem that his troops could not carry them out. Monty made no bold plan that actually succeeded. This goes hand-in-hand with my response to point 4 above. Since he seemed to know that his troops were not very good, why then did he continue to draw up elaborate plans that they could not execute? His plans at El Alamein, the Mareth Line, Sicily, Normandy, Market-Garden, and Veritable all were complex or flawed, and the British army performed badly in each. Either his plans were needlessly complex, or he failed to "let go" of scripted plans when a more free-wheeling agressive approach was needed (such as in the North African pursuit, his inexcusable slowness during the landings on Italy, or at Falaise).

I think it is appropriate to sum up Monty's command by stating that he rarely had the right answer for the situation he found himself in. His close-run victory at El Alamein cemented his reputation as a great military leader prematurely. All of his subsequent battles went overly slowly or were outright failures. Further, he clearly did not appreciate the ability of the Americans, at least by the Sicilian invasion of 1943. By then, it is fair to say that the American army was as good as, and probably was better than, the British army. His planning did not take this into account, and he must be criticized for this as well: putting the British army in the most difficult positions (e.g. in the east in Sicily and against Caen in Normandy) reflected the realities of 1942, not 1943 or 1944.

Monty did provide a politically-necessary victory at El Alamein. There is little doubt that Churchill, who otherwise was not a vigorous supporter, allowed him to remain in command because of that. Separating the man from the myth (much of it created by the man himself) is difficult and for some, painful. Yet to better understand the operational peroformance of the British army in World War II, we need to do just that.

It is interesting to me to note that most of the arguments in support of Monty are in the form of excuses. Since there is very little positive evidence of his greatness, the arguments are instead explanations of why he failed (the Germans had too many tanks, his logisitics were stretched, the terrain was difficult, the weather was bad, the opposing commander was brilliant). Of course, these problems are fairly consistent in war, and one should expect difficult circumstances and enemy resistance. Great leaders overcome these. Mediocre leaders use them as excuses for their poor performance.

I have no doubt that this essay has ruffled the feathers of any British readers. Unfortunately, much of the "debate" about who the best commander was in the Second World War turns on patriotism and national pride. Some of you will accuse me of criticizing Monty simply because I am an American. Some of you will point out that there is a long list of failed American commanders from the Second World War. I have no defense against the first criticism: I am indeed an American and all I can do is assure you that the source of this critique is not blind patriotism. My response to the second criticism is to state that it is beside the point.