The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality
The
Battle of Kursk is one of the most familiar battles of the Eastern Front. Those casually acquainted with the Second
World War usually know of only two battles between the Soviets and the Germans:
Stalingrad and Kursk. Unfortunately,
knowledge of the Battle of Kursk is only just now being improved. Despite a growing number of good analyses
available to the public, the myths of Kursk are hard to put to rest. This essay will hopefully help this cause.
Background to the Battle
The
Kursk salient that the Germans hoped to surround and destroy was a result of
the battles in the winter and spring of 1943.
After the Soviets surrounded Stalingrad and forced the Germans out of
the Caucasus, their offensive did not stop.
It continued westward, taking important cities such as Rostov and
Kharkov. However, the Red Army
overextended itself, and was ripe for a counterattack. The riposte destroyed many of the Soviet
units and cleared much of the territory they had taken. This included Kharkov, but not much of the
territory north of the city. Hence the
Soviet salient protruding into German lines.
The overall operational idea was to pause to rest and refit the forces
that had participated in Manstein's counterattacks, to wait for the development
of new equipment (Panther tanks, Elefant tank destroyers, and some other
weaponry), and to build up new units.
Then launch the attack to destroy the salient. The code name for the operation was
"CITADEL".
From
these plans, it is clear that CITADEL was purely operational. Even a complete German success would not have
fundamentally changed the strategic situation on the East Front. At most, it would have delayed subsequent
Soviet offensives, but it is hard to argue that a German success would have
prevented them, or created some sort of long-term stalemate to allow the
Germans to turn and defeat the Western Allies (the US and the UK). It simply was not big enough, although it surely
represented the largest operation that the German Army could have
launched. In fact, once launched it
became clear that even CITADEL was outside the scope of what the Germans could
accomplish.
Myths of CITADEL
There
is a tremendous amount of misunderstanding about how CITADEL progressed. This misunderstanding is fueled by
oft-repeated, but false, descriptions of the combat that took place. Perhaps no other author has contributed as
much to these myths as Martin Caiden.
His book, The Tigers are Burning
was published in 1973 and quickly became a bestseller, and was a
"selection of the month" for various book clubs. Due to its popularity it was reprinted in
1980. It is fairly safe to say that the
main, if not only, source of information on CITIDEL for western readers was
Caiden's book. This is unfortunate,
because although his book is exciting to read (it ranks with Tom Clancy's best
thrillers), it is almost entirely wrong.
It is so wrong, that I have seen it stocked in the "fiction"
section of used book stores, which is entirely appropriate.
Caiden's
book is the product of Soviet propaganda.
With no access to Soviet archives, and since he did no archival work in the
(accessible) West German archives, it was inevitable that Caiden would be
fooled. Indeed the predicable result was
a foolish book. Why did Soviet
propaganda need to inflate the significance of the Battle of Kursk? Why did it need to inflate the scope of the
battle and the losses the Germans took?
Because at the tactical level, the Red Army suffered greatly. Some units were almost completely wiped
out. In order to justify the losses they
took, particularly in the battle in front of Prokhorovka, the Soviets inflated
the size, power, and losses of the German forces. Caiden, unable and unwilling to filter this
deception out, simply spiced up the descriptions and inserted the Soviet
figures directly into his book. Only
lately, in the last 10 years or so, have we been able to gain a balanced
analytical perspective on CITADEL. As a
result, it is time to do some "myth busting".
Myth #1: CITADEL was one
distinct battle, primarily between tank forces of both sides. Wrong!
CITADEL was gigantic, both in terms of the forces involved and the areas
fought over. And while the armored units
of both sides did much of the glamorous fighting, ultimately the operation was
won and lost by infantry divisions. Most
of the division-sized units employed by both sides were infantry, not
armored. Regarding the size of the
operation, the "front lines" of CITADEL stretched for hundreds of
miles, and the territory fought over spanned thousands of square miles. While some areas saw rather high
concentrations of troops, CITADEL hardly follows the popular picture of units
wedged together, with no room to maneuver.
The size of the operation ensured that CITADEL was not "one
battle". Considering that the
Germans used three armies, one on the north portion, two on the south, it is
baffling to think that some people envision CITADEL as a tactical fight.
Myth #2: The battle at Prokhorovka was the largest
tank battle in history. This is probably the
most-repeated claim about CITADEL. It is
also misleading and almost certainly wrong.
The typical claim is that the battle at Prokhorovka was massive,
involving two thousand tanks. While a
significant battle, it was nowhere near as large as the myth supposes. One way people arrive at inflated numbers is
to assume that all three SS Panzergrenadier divisions participated. In fact, only one, the Liebsstandarte Adolf
Hitler (LSSAH) fought this battle. The
other two were on the flanks of the LSSAH (Totenkopf on the left, and largely
across the Psel River, and Das Reich on the right) and were fighting their own
separate battles. At the time of the
battle, LSSAH had already been in combat for about a week and was substantially
depleted. By July 11th and 12th,
the two main days of the battle, LSSAH was down to about 100 tanks, assault
guns, and tank destroyers (not including observation tanks). The Soviet units that participated in the
battle at Prokhorovka were the 18th and 29th Tank Corps,
along with a separate detachment under General Trufanov. These units combined were able to field about
421 tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers.
So, contrary to the popular claims of "thousands" of tanks
fighting it out in front of Prokhorovka, we have about 517, of which 455 were
actually "tanks". I have
provided data for the number of on-hand
(that is, ready to fight) armored fighting vehicles for July 10, 11, and
12. Note that these numbers fluctuate
for a variety of reasons: temporary losses due to damage, permanent losses due
to destruction, and returns from repair shops.
German AFVs
On-Hand and Operational
|
AFV |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
|
Pz III |
11 |
12 |
12 |
|
Pz IV |
42 |
48 |
32 |
|
Pz VI Tiger |
4 |
3 |
3 |
|
Marder III |
20 |
19 |
19 |
|
StuG III |
20 |
10 |
20 |
|
Pz I |
2 |
2 |
2 |
|
Pz II |
4 |
4 |
4 |
|
TOTAL |
109 |
99 |
92 |
Soviet AFVs
On-Hand and Operational
|
|
|
18th TC |
|
|
29th TC |
|
|
Trufanov |
|
|
AFV |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
|
KV I |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Churchill |
18 |
18 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
T-34 |
50 |
68 |
26 |
122 |
123 |
20 |
35 |
35 |
27 |
|
T-70 |
49 |
58 |
35 |
82 |
81 |
29 |
9 |
9 |
6 |
|
SU-122 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
12 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
SU-76 |
8 |
8 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
TOTAL |
125 |
152 |
76 |
224 |
225 |
58 |
44 |
44 |
33 |
Given
these numbers, it is not likely that the battle at Prokhorovka was the
"largest tank battle in history".
In fact, it is smaller than a battle that took place between the French
and the Germans in 1940. In front of Gembloux
on May 14-15, two full-strength Panzer divisions (each with about 300 tanks)
squared off with two full-strength French Light Mechanized Divisions (each with
about 260 tanks).
Myth #3: Russian tanks rammed
German ones. This fanciful notion has Soviet tanks,
knowing that their guns would be ineffective against the tough German armor,
close to point-blank range and begin to ram German tanks to knock them
out. Hogwash! There is in fact no evidence of this. It never appears in any reports, German or
Soviet. The stories of tank ramming
typically focus on KV tanks ramming Tigers.
Considering there were a grand total of 1 KV tank (most certainly a
command tank) and only 4 Tigers, this is incredibly unlikely. Rather, these stories are a product of embellished
accounts, and propagandized Soviet versions designed to "play up" the
fierceness of the battle so as to justify their losses. Note too that hardly any of the German AFVs
present (just the 4 Tigers) had armor that would be able to consistently
withstand Russian firepower. The only documented instance of tank-ramming I am
aware of is in Normandy, when a British Sherman rammed a German Tiger.
Myth #4: Prokhorovka
was the "death ride of the Panzers" because the Germans lost
so many tanks.
Traditional
western sources, citing propagandized Soviet accounts, place tank losses at
Prokhorovka for both sides at about 1200.
Considering the fact that less than half that number even participated
in the battle, this number is ridiculous.
If it was anything, it was the death ride of the 29th Tank
Corp, which experienced a 75% drop in its number of on-hand AFVs in one day. In fact, the Germans barely noticed the
effects of the battle at Prokhorovka, while the Soviets had several units
rendered ineffective in a matter of hours.
Simply put, the Germans put a licking on the Red Army. I have provided data for the number of
"damaged" and "destroyed/abandoned" AFVs July 10, 11, and
12.
German AFVs Out
Of Action Due to Damage
|
AFV |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
|
Pz III |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Pz IV |
0 |
12 |
0 |
|
Pz VI Tiger |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
Marder III |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
StuG III |
2 |
9 |
0 |
|
Pz I |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Pz II |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Soviet AFVs Out
of Action Due to Damage
|
|
|
18th TC |
|
|
29th TC |
|
|
Trufanov |
|
|
AFV |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
July 10 |
July 11 |
July 12 |
|
KV I |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Churchill |
18 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
T-34 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
|
T-70 |
4 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
SU-122 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |