brute force

Brute Force?

The Simplistic Reason for Why the Allies Won

One question from the Second World War that enjoys continued debate today is "why did the Allies win, if the Germans were so good?" Frequently, the answer is "brute force". Simply, the argument is that overwhelming economic, material, and manpower advantages negated the tactical and operational superiority of the Germans. The Allies just slowly ground away, and eventually wore the enemy out by soaking up every last drop of German military power.

This argument is attractive for several reasons. First, the German army, at least early in the war, was spectacularly better than its opponents. Citino, in Quest for Decisive Victory, points out that such operational brilliance had not been realized in almost a century. A long list of countries were overrun in quick succession, and it looked as if no other country, not France, Britain, or the Soviet Union, could possibly ever match the Germans on the battlefield. Yet the Germans lost the war, and lost it to apparently inferior forces. Second, Germany did suffer comparative disadvantages in its economy, the number of weapons fielded, and manpower reserves. Consequently, the Allies fielded armies that were much larger than the German army. All the Allies needed to do was to attack everywhere and the Germans could not possibly keep up. With a quick glance, it appears that was what the Allies did. Finally, the length of the war makes it appear that it was brute force rather than operational competence that won the war. It took the Allies longer to liberate territory than it took the Germans to grab it in the first place.

In this essay, I will point out the flaws in this argument, and I will respond by showing that the answer of "brute force" to the question of "why did the Allies win" is misleadingly simplistic. The Allies did certainly field larger forces than the Germans, but my argument is that this advantage was neither necessary nor sufficient for victory.

A "necessary" cause?

To be a necessary cause, numerical disadvantages when attacking must always result in defeat. In other words, as a necessity for victory, numerical advantages must be present for that victory. Anyone even casually acquainted with the Second World War knows that numerical advantages were not a necessary cause of victory on the battlefield. The Germans themselves demonstrated this repeatedly by scoring many operational victories over the Allies, even when attacking with a smaller force. The most obvious is the defeat of France and the Low Countries in 1940. Another example is the British defeat of the Italians in Cyrenaica, culminating with the battle at Bedda Fomm.

The fact that numerical advantages are not a necessary cause ensures that the "brute force" argument is simplistic. If numbers are not needed, what else is? Is there something else that operates in conjunction with the size of an army? Is there some other explanation that is a necessary cause by itself, independent of numbers? These are intriguing questions that the simplistic answer of "brute force" conveniently ignores.

A "sufficient" cause?

To be a sufficient cause, numerical advantages must always result in victory. In other words, it may not be the only way to win, but one sure way is to show up on the battlefield with a larger army than your opponent. Again, anyone casually acquainted with the Second World War knows that numerical advantages were not sufficient for victory. The Soviets, unfortunately for them, attacked repeatedly throughout 1941, 1942, and the first half of 1943 with numerically superior forces, yet won few battlefield victories. The German counterattack at Mortain enjoyed local superiority in troops and tanks, yet it was halted in its tracks.

The fact that numerical advantages are not a sufficient cause also ensures that the "brute force" argument is simplistic. If numbers do not ensure victory, then certainly the Allies had to make some sort of adjustment or improvement to how they fought. The Allies enjoyed this superiority practically the entire war, yet their first operational victories over the Germans did not occur until the end of 1942 (and even then, it would be some time before another such victory was scored).

Why the Allies won

By now it should be apparent that some other explanations are required, beyond the simplistic recognition that the Allies enjoyed material and numerical superiority. Specifically, what exactly translated that superiority into victory? It seems that early in the war, the Allies did not know how to translate their numerical advantages into victories over the Germans. This suggests that something changed within the Allied armies, within the German army, or within the armies of both sides. To suggest that brute force was the only engine of victory for the Allies implies that the war was fought by rather static institutions. This is an incorrect picture. Organizations, particularly those in hostile environments (the typical example from the field of Public Administration is a government agency in a hostile budget environment) adapt, innovate, and learn. The results of these changes (either positive or negative) will be a function of organizational leadership, expertise, communication, and political support. No greater example of this fact is the armies in the Second World War.

Simply put, the allied armies, particularly the American and Soviet armies innovated and learned a great deal, and were able to adapt successfully. Compared to the armies those two countries fielded at the start of the war, the armies at the end of the war were not only more powerful but they were better. They were better-led, better-organized, more able to coordinate with other services, and had improved their operational methods (even if they didn't completely revise their doctrinal manuals).

The United States' army was unique in that it suffered from the least amount of political interference. Unlike Stalin, Hitler, and Churchill, Roosevelt had very little input in operational issues. This most certainly was a contributing factor to the ultimately high-quality performance of the U.S. Army. Critics point out that the unprofessional meddling by the other three led to serious military reverses. However, at least Churchill and Stalin were less likely to meddle in tactical affairs, and were more receptive to professional advice of military leaders. Hitler, on the other hand, gradually gained control over more and more of the military's chain of command. This is not to say that "it was Hitler's fault" that Germany lost, but that the German military institution ceased to function effectively because its chain of command had been seriously compromised. Any amateur would have performed as badly as Hitler. Thus it was not Hitler per se but the fact that politics and amateurness had intruded into the operational decision making of the German army.

Allied leadership in the field also dramatically improved during the war. The U.S. Army was particularly ruthless in weeding out failed commanders. The British army also replaced poor commanders, although not as quickly as the U.S. army did. The Soviet army suffered initially from leaders appointed via patronage (i.e. their position was gained via personal loyalty to Stalin). Needless to say, the commanders that remained after the purges of the military were unqualified and scared. From Stalin's point of view, they were perfect since they were loyal. From a military point of view, they were disastrous. Thankfully for the Red Army, these leaders were almost completely wiped out in the German advances of 1941. Those that replaced them were better-trained, and given a somewhat longer leash by Stalin. The German army, at the start of the war, possessed the best leadership of any army. This unmatched prowess in operational warfare was diminished, however, as Hitler began firing individuals for "disloyalty". As more politically-palatable replacements took their places, operational performance of the army was degraded. In a way, the development of the Soviet and German armies went in opposite directions. The Soviets went from political hacks-as-leaders to professionals, and the Germans largely went the other way.

Organizationally, the U.S. and Soviet armies improved dramatically. Both armies redesigned the structure of their combat units (e.g. the U.S. moved away from the "heavy" armored division) which improved command and control and combat effectiveness, as units at the start of the war were too large or unbalanced. The British army suffered greatly in this area throughout the war. Its armored divisions were poorly organized, and this deficiency was not remedied. These problems are revealed in the many failed or nearly-failed armored operations of the British army during the war. The German army started the war with the greatest innovation of the 1930s: a properly balanced, combined arms armored division. With panzer and motorized divisions to provide decisive maneuver, infantry divisions could follow up and secure territory, provide flank protection, or complete the encirclement of the enemy. As the war progressed, however, the German army lost this organizational edge. It diversified excessively, creating a myriad of unit types and increased administrative headaches. The U.S. army in Europe had two main types of divisions, armored and infantry, along with just a handful of other special types (some airborne units and one mountain division). The Germans had in 1944 and 1945 no less than eight, each with a unique order of battle: panzer, SS-panzer, panzergrenadier, SS-panzergrenadier, infantry, Luftwaffe, Fallshirmjaeger, Volksgrenadier. Add to this an even larger number of non-divisional support units of battalion size or larger (e.g. heavy tank battalions and a bewildering array of tank destroyer and assault gun units). The German army by 1944 had become incredibly inefficient, groaning under its own administrative weight. To make things worse, the German army was the least-standardized when it comes to weapons. In one division in 1944 you might find two types of tanks (PzKw IV and PzKw V), assault guns based on older tanks (StuGs based on the PzKw III), self-propelled guns based on yet another chassis (perhaps the PzKw 38t), and maybe two different models of halftracks (the 251 and the 250). The logistic requirements for the Germans were thus far more complex than for the Allies.

Operationally, the Allied armies also improved, although the U.S. and Soviet armies far outpaced the British in this regard. Early Allied performance was pathetic. The British were not able to cobble together a successful operation against the Germans until El Alamein, having been booted off the Continent twice (from France and from Greece) and losing Cyrenaica and Crete along the way. The Soviet army was flattened in a matter of months in what has to be one of the most terrible military performances in history. The U.S. army was humiliated in Tunisia, where it became painfully obvious that there was a huge gap between the Americans and the Germans regarding professionalism and sheer ability. Yet within months, or maybe a year, of these disasters, the Allies began to win operational victories. With intensified training programs, better officer education, rationalized methods for combined arms operations, and some doctrinal and planning adjustments, the Allied armies improved quickly. The Germans, on the other hand, seem to have stagnated or maybe even suffered reverses in how effectively they conducted battlefield operations. With no obvious or coherent strategy, the Germans were content to string operations together, which became problematic in the Soviet Union because (a) the Soviet Union did not collapse quickly as had other German opponents, and (b) the divergent directions of German operations violated the principle of concentration of force. Further, German operational thinking became stale: the Kursk offensive was so obvious that anyone could have predicted (or planned) it. The Mortain counter-attack against the American breakout was hurried, disjointed, and irresponsible. German defenses became brittle after 1943 as commanders refused to break away from orders to stand fast. By 1944 it is clear that the operational edge was in the Allied favor, even though it took a while for that edge to be won.

Conclusion

It's obvious that to say the Allies won simply because they enjoyed material and numerical superiority is overly-simplistic. It implies that to predict victory, all one needs to do is count up men and tanks, and figure out who has the most firepower. This masks many interesting elements of the Second World War. Most of the operations from 1939 through 1945 demonstrate that having the largest force does not necessarily lead to victory. How that force is used is obviously critical. The Germans defeated, quite easily, enemy forces with superior firepower in the first half of the war. For the Allies, it became crucial that they learn how to wield their forces. Superior numbers are irrelevant if they are thrown away. The Germans were always at a disadvantage during the war. The ability of the Allies to improve their performance is much more interesting, and meaningful, to discuss. The Allies may or may not have been "as good as" or "better" than the German army, but that is irrelevent. The Allies became "good enough" so as to better-apply the forces they had and the Germans stagnated or became worse.

I'm sure that some of the bean-counters out there are disappointed with this essay. They will point out that the Soviets continued to take huge casualties throughout the war. They will point out "conclusions" like Dupuy's that supposedly show that the Allies were never as good as the Germans, even in victory and that therefore the German army remains the ideal model.

It is true that the Soviet Union suffered high casualties throughout the war. This masks their improvement however; later operations were conducted with fewer casualties, so there was indeed improvement in tactics. It remains that perhaps on the tactical level the Soviets could not match the Germans. That issue was rendered irrelevant, however, by the definitive operational superiority of the Soviets over the Germans. What could not be solved on the tactical level was dealt with operationally. To me, this represents a frank self-evaluation on the part of the Red Army and represents a remarkable degree of institutional learning. The Germans never adjusted, which is curious. What good is winning a tactical firefight if your division or corps loses the operational battle? To those who support Dupuy's conclusions that the German army was "more effective", I say that his calculations are based on bad and improper data, that his formulas are not statistically or substantively sound, and that a deterministic model of war does not make much sense anyway. Perhaps that will be the subject of a future essay.