**Phenomenology and Foucault; Prof. Boedeker;**

**Worksheet on psychologism and neo-Kantianism: *History of the Concept of Time*, pp. 1-26**

1. In Section 1, Heidegger attempts to motivate his investigation into history and nature by pointing to contemporary crises in several sciences. How does Heidegger conceive the relation between philosophy and the sciences?

2. In Section 2, Heidegger argues that some preparation is needed before an investigation of the concepts of nature and history can begin. He follows Immanuel Kant (1724-1803) in calling such preparation “*prolegomena*”, which literally means “what lies before”. The prolegomena to such an investigation include an explication of the “horizon” in terms of which these concepts have meaning. Why does Heidegger call (the concept of) time the “horizon” of (the concepts of) history and nature?

In Section 3, Heidegger outlines his ambitious plan for the whole lecture-course:

Preliminary Part (pp. 13-131), which includes Chapter 1 (pp. 13-26), Chapter 2 (pp. 27-89), and Chapter 3 (pp. 90-131).

First Part (“The analysis of the phenomenon of time and the determination of the concept of time”, or “The interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being”; pp. 133-end). This includes:

the four Chapters of Division I (“The preparatory description of the field in which the phenomenon of time becomes manifest”, or “The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein”; pp. 135-304); and

the very beginning of the Division II (“The exposition of time itself”, or “Dasein and temporality”; pp. 305-end).

Heidegger completes Division II of the First Part in *Being and Time*, but never gets around to writing Division III (“The conceptual interpretation of time”, or “Time and being”) of the First Part.

He also envisioned a Second Part (“The history of the concept of time”) and a Third Part (“The initial conceptual discovery of time in Aristotle”) to the whole project. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger compacted these into a single Second Part (“Basic features of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of temporality”), which would move backwards from Kant through Descartes and back to Aristotle. He made some serious headway on the Kant discussion at the beginning of the Second Part in his 1929 book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, but eventually abandoned the whole program of *Being and Time*.

3. In Section 4, Heidegger gives his interpretation of the history of (German and French) philosophy since the middle of the 19th Century. Try to outline the major steps in this history, including Positivism, neo-Kantianism, and Dilthey.

4. Heidegger regards the concept of *intentionality* as Franz Brentano’s great innovation. Explain this concept in your own words, giving an example.