

Frege, Gottlob, Montgomer Furth ed.,  
"Every Proposition of Begriffsschrift  
Expresses a Thought", University  
of California Press, 1964, part 2,  
section I, pp.89-90

### §32. Every proposition of Begriffsschrift expresses a thought.

In this way it is shown that our eight primitive names have denotation, and thereby that the same holds good for all names correctly compounded out of these. However, not only a denotation, but also a sense, appertains to all names correctly formed from our signs. Every such name of a truth-value *expresses a*

sense, a *thought*. Namely, by our stipulations it is determined under what conditions the name denotes the True. The sense of this name—the *thought*—is the thought that these conditions are fulfilled. Now a proposition of Begriffsschrift consists of the judgment-stroke and of a name or a Roman mark of a truth-value. (But such a mark is transformed into the name of a truth-value by the introduction of Gothic letters in place of Roman letters and the prefixing of concavities according to §17. If we imagine this carried out, then we have only the case in which the proposition is composed of the judgment-stroke and a name of a truth-value.) It is now asserted by such a proposition that this name does denote the True. Since at the same time it expresses a thought, we have in every correctly-formed proposition of Begriffsschrift a judgment that a thought is true; and here a thought certainly cannot be lacking. It will be the reader's task to make clear to himself the thought of each proposition of Begriffsschrift, and I shall take pains to facilitate this as much as possible at the outset. 51

The names, whether simple or themselves composite, of which the name of a truth-value consists, contribute to the expression of the thought, and this contribution of the individual [component] is its *sense*. If a name is part of the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is part of the thought expressed by the latter name.

### §33. Principles of definition.

The following are our standard principles for definitions:

1. Every name correctly formed from the defined names must have a denotation. Thus it must always be possible to produce a name, compounded out of our eight primitive names, that is the same as it in meaning\*, and the latter must be unambiguously determined by the definitions, up to inessential choices of particular Gothic and Greek letters.

2. It follows from this that the same thing may never be defined twice, because it would then remain in doubt whether these definitions were consistent with one another.

3. The name defined must be simple; that is, it may not be composed of any familiar names or names that are yet to be defined; for otherwise it would remain in doubt whether the

definitions of the names were consistent with one another.